Note:
This piece is largely written without reference to the current financial
problems of the EU. Its aim is to address the underlying principle of the EU
rather than its current problems.
In 1962, a senior British politician made the
following statement about the idea of a federal Europe:
“We must be clear about this; it does mean, if this is the idea, the end of
Britain as an independent European state. I make no apology for repeating it.
It means the end of a thousand years of history.”
That politician was Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labour
Party, and it was quite typical of early Labour attitudes towards the various
incarnations of what became the EU. The Attlee government had been hostile
towards the first stirrings of the European project, the Coal and Steel
Community, on the basis that it was an intolerable intrusion on British political
sovereignty and the distinctive British parliamentary path towards socialism.
However, the issue of Labour’s attitude towards European economic and political
integration only really became prominent with Gaitskell’s impassioned arguments
in the context of MacMillan’s failed application for Britain to join the Common Market in the early sixties.
Gaitskell’s visceral hostility to the Common Market
was the first prominent salvo in a battle for the soul of Labour over Europe
that lasted a quarter of a century. That battle had its quiet periods, and it
was characterised by many alterations in fortune for both sides.
The pro-Europeans, led by the treacherous Roy
Jenkins, had their victories. For a while in the sixties Wilson committed the
Labour government to entry, until that application failed in 1967. Most
notably, Jenkins and other assorted Labour backsliders voted against the Labour
whip to provide Ted Heath with the greatest victory of his career; that is,
entry to the EC. By the time of the referendum on Britain’s membership in 1975,
most prominent Labour politicians, notably Wilson and Callaghan, had, more out
of inertia and convenience than any great conviction, backed staying in, and
their side duly won that referendum.
However, the enduring fact was that between 1962 and
the late 1980s, the underlying position of the majority of the Labour movement
was one of hostility to the European Community. Most major trade unions were
opposed, much of the grassroots membership and many Labour supporters in the country were, to
varying degrees, sceptical, and a number of prominent MPs, from Tony Benn and
Barbara Castle to Peter Shore and Michael Foot, fought against Britain entering
or staying in the EC. Labour voted against the European Communities Act which
facilitated British entry to the EC (with the exception of those Europhiles
like Jenkins, Rodgers and Williams, most of whom ended up betraying the Labour
movement by their formation of the SDP), and in several manifestos pledged
explicitly to leave the EC.
I recount these historical facts to provide context
to those who have grown up in the modern Labour Party. Such people may not be
aware that Labour has ever had a position different from its view over the past
fifteen years: that is to say, largely unconsidered and occasionally ambivalent
support. Divisions clearly did not disappear entirely. Brown and his followers
in government were marginally more Eurosceptic than the Blairites, and an
honourable tradition of backbench hostility, in the form of old hands like
Austin Mitchell, endured. However, if anything summed up Labour’s attitude
toward the EU in the New Labour years, it was a lack of interest. We never made
much of it, in contrast to the Tories, because, in general, it was not an issue
that the majority of the electorate expressed much concern about. We fell into quiet
pro-EU orthodoxy more out of inertia and indifference than anything else. I
largely followed this line as a young activist, without giving it much thought.
However, recently I have seriously began to re-think
this position and have changed my view significantly.
In order to illustrate this, we need to go back to
the moment when Labour’s position on the EU is usually considered to have
fundamentally changed. This was Jacque Delors’s famous speech to the 1988 TUC
conference when he presented the EC as a refuge from the ravages of
Thatcherism, the only means of defending workers’ rights. He sold the EU to the
Labour Party and the unions on the basis of the supposed merits of its ‘social
dimension’. This consolidated the pre-existing shift in direction from Kinnock
on the issue, and prepared the ground for Kinnock’s openly pro-EU conference
speech in 1988.
From then on, the debate over the EU has been
largely presented within the Labour Party and wider mainstream left as being
essentially a question of defining the socio-economic consequences of our
membership of the EU. If it can be shown that the neoliberal side of EU policy
is most prominent, in the form of, for example, its emphasis on free markets in
goods, services, labour, and capital, and the deregulation and liberalisation
of those markets, the argument goes, then we should be anti-EU, or at least in
favour of radical reform of the policies of the EU from the inside. If the
social aspects of the EU are perceived to be predominant, in the form of the
Social Chapter and the protection of workers’ rights, then we should be pro-EU.
So, for example, the short-lived NO2EU party, which stood in the 2009 European
Elections and was the brainchild of Bob Crow, took the former position. Labour
MEPs are keen on making the latter argument, which has become the orthodox
position of the Labour Party.
It is not surprising that in 1988, after 9 years of
punishing Thatcherite government, the Labour movement was, like a thirsty man
staggering about in the desert, desperate for any sustenance that it could
perceive, or at least thought it could perceive. Trades unionists and beleaguered
Labour MPs did not see anything much to lose in such a context by throwing
their lot in with the EU. Surely, they thought, it has to be improvement on
preserving national sovereignty when that sovereignty was in the possession of
a right-wing Tory coterie.
However, my contention is that the entire framework
within which this argument takes place is misconceived.
There are clearly arguments on both sides in terms
of the consequences of EU membership on the nature of British socio-economic
policy. The Left is divided, as we have seen. The Right is also divided, between
those who think that regulations emanating from the EU have produced an unduly
inflexible labour market and excessive red-tape which has stunted growth, and
those who praise the advantages provided by the EU to the functioning of a
capitalist market economy.
The complexion of the EU is, as such, truly in the
eye of the beholder. It is like a brilliant piece of quartz that looks mesmerisingly
different depending on which angle you hold it at. Given the ambiguous,
slow-sand-shifting nature of the EU, this is inevitable. The policies of the EU
have been decided by a massive, ever-changing constellation of political forces
over a long period. They are the result of a massive bureaucratic decision
making process that encompasses the representatives of 27 nation states within
numerous different institutions, most notably the Commission, the Council of
Ministers and the European Parliament.
We must also factor in the sprawling negotiations between countless heads of
state and bureaucrats that resulted in the numerous treaties that shaped the
underlying structure of the EU, from Paris to Lisbon. The EU’s policies have
been the result of a painstaking, inordinately complicated political sausage
factory over 60 years. The ultimate character of the EU’s economic and social
policies is determined by the overall political balance of forces within
Europe, which inevitably tos-and-fros. Often this balance of forces is more a
deadlock of forces, which necessitates compromises to satisfy the vanities of
multifarious different governments, statesmen and political parties, not to
mention unelected elites. This makes the EU fundamentally ambiguous in
character. It is scarcely any wonder that a bewildering variety of politicians
manage to hold identical positions on the EU despite having almost nothing else
in common; everyone can find something within this colossal Euro mish-mash to
suit their prejudices if they wish, and with such eclectic material ideologues
of both sides can patch together a case for or against according to which
elements they choose to emphasise, and it is to some extent a matter of
circumstance, convenience and temperament which side they choose to fall on.
With this in mind, I would nonetheless at this stage
register my (no doubt partial) view that the EU in the past decade or so has
gone substantially down the path of imposing neoliberal orthodoxy and
austerity, both in its recent handling of the Eurozone crisis, the growth and
stability pact (and other similar attempts at a common economic policy), and in
terms of the impact of many of its directives on competition policy and state
aid, which have undermined collective bargaining, sane, interventionist
industrial policy, national employment standards and wage rates.
However, this is in many ways beside the point. The
very ambiguous nature of the EU shows the fundamental problem with it. If we,
as British Leftists, are lucky enough to live in an era of social-democratic
dominance within Europe, with most major European countries enjoying
left-leaning governments, then eventually the EU sausage machine might crank out
some bangers of consolation, as the drift of policy within the EU goes our way.
If we are unlucky, as we have been recently, the opposite might occur, which
might mean, for example, a drift towards an emphasis on market liberalisation
and an erosion of workers’ rights that we might not like. The point is,
however, is that British national policy on many issues becomes largely at the
mercy of forces over which we as a nation have little control, and which, for
that very reason, are not very susceptible to proper democratic control.
This links in to the fundamental and profound point.
Democracy, that is to say, representative democracy in the way we understand
it, as embodied in our system of parliamentary democracy, has its natural
geographical and national limits. The EU, while it is still made up of nation
states who see themselves as meaningful and distinct cultural and political
units, can never be properly or meaningfully democratic. A democracy can only
function in a political unit in which all its individual members see themselves
having enough of a common existence for the will of its majority to represent
something meaningful. The nation state and representative democracy appeared at
much the same time in history, which was no coincidence. Only the large degree
of commonality of identity provided by being members of the same nation state (or
similar unit) has ever provided the conditions for a legitimate representative
democracy. The EU is made up of 500 million people, and the vast, vast majority
of those people do not recognise the kind of common European citizenship that
would be required to make EU-wide democracy meaningful. They see themselves as being
citizens of nation states, and will accept as binding and legitimate decisions
taken in a democratic way only at a national level. For example, if we had a
European-wide referendum on an issue, and Britain vote 95% to support one side,
but every other EU country voted 95% the other way, then the overall result
would be for the side Britain did not support, and we as a nation would have to
put up with it. That would not make it any easier for Britain to swallow, and, I
daresay the same would be the case if you replaced the word ‘Britain’ with
practically any other country in Europe. This is because it would feel like a
decision being imposed by alien forces upon us as a nation.
There are several reasons for this. One is the issue
of size. In a democracy, each individual by definition has his or her say on the
overall policy diluted in proportion to the size of the population of the state
in question. The very nature of representative democracy makes this dilution
considerable. However, it seems to me that there must be a point at which it
becomes so diluted as to be akin to a homeopathic treatment. It seems to me
that such a point of dilution would be reached in a polity as large as a
hypothetical United States of Europe. There are clearly variations in size
between nations, but there seems an upper-limit to the level of dilution that
will be widely accepted which is rarely contravened by the population of an
average or even large nation state. This seems to me to be a matter of intuitive
common sense.
The other, and more profound, reason is that the EU
is not and will never be constituted as a polity in such a way as to mean that
it could attempt to have democratic institutions in a way analogous to a nation
state. The only way that it could possibly work would be to have a federal
system, which is the practical solution adopted by the two largest democracies
in the world, and the only two real cases that would be analogous to a United
States of Europe; that is, India and the USA. However, these countries have a
sufficient consciousness of a national identity to make some degree of unity at
the federal level, in terms of, for example, foreign and defence policy,
possible (though this is sometimes debatable in the case of the USA). This consciousness of a common national
identity does not exist to sustain any level of democratic federal government
in the EU at large. Some idealists who find within their own bosom a zealous
consciousness of a common Europeanism may wish this were not the case, but they
are deluding themselves.
So the EU ends up in the worst of all worlds due to
the natural consequences of political, cultural and national realities. Its
member states are too jealous of their national identities, of being German or
British or French rather than European, for a federal system, with a properly
democratic structure at the federal level, to exist. However, they are not prepared
to dissolve the EU and revert to being nation states with the democratic
apparatus of a unitary state as the only means of mediating the operation of
their sovereignty. So, the decisions taken in common have largely fallen
outside the control of proper democratic accountability. Many decisions are
taken by elected heads of state in the Council of Ministers, which is typically
unsatisfactory for two reasons. Either it leads to some nations imposing their views
on other nations, which, since most people perceive themselves to exist
politically primarily as voting citizens of their nation state, is not
perceived as being democratic. On the other hand, if there is deadlock in the
Council of Ministers due to the need for unanimity on some topics, then nothing
happens. For this reason qualified majority voting has increasingly replaced
unanimous decision making and has been diluted to make it easier for things to
pass. Even more worryingly, the Commission has become more and more powerful.
Let us not forget that the Commission is utterly lacking in democratic
accountability. The people of Europe have no way of removing the commissioners,
who have such a colossal influence over the lives of millions of people, by the
ballot box or any other peaceful means. In other words, the rules have been
changed to make it easier for large nations to push through the policies they
prefer, or responsibility has been given to a non-democratic body to get around
this problem.
Of course, the European Parliament does have some
role, and it has enjoyed a moderate increase in power since its inception.
However, it suffers from the same problems as every other EU institution. Since
hardly anyone in Europe sees themselves as primarily or even significantly a
democratic citizen of the EU due to the lack of a meaningful unifying European identity,
but instead see themselves as essentially citizens of their nation state, they
would not be prepared to see the European parliament as the authentic
legislative body expressing their will even if it had the power of a national
parliament, which, of course, it does not.
In short, only a people who perceive themselves as a
unified political unit can be represented satisfactorily in a democratic
institution. Since the former condition does not exist, and is not likely to
ever exist, among the people of the EU, the EU cannot and will not ever have political
institutions that are properly democratic.
This raises further questions. At least, it does if
you are an ideologically convinced Euro-federalist. Is it the fault of the
people of Europe that they do not see themselves as, first and foremost,
citizens of Europe, prepared to embrace an out and out federal system? Is the
inability to eliminate the mindset of identification at the political level of
the nation a symptom of an immaturity that will eventually render the EU and
its member states a geopolitical irrelevance?
These questions give a flavour of the tone of elitist
arrogance that characterises those within the EU who favour a federal solution.
It is, as usual, the fault of the stupidity and parochial character of the
people of Europe, who do not understand the infinitely subtle mechanism being
constructed by their superiors. This arrogance has been shown in the constant
attempts of Euro-federalist elites to force us into ‘ever closer union’ with
little consultation of the people of Europe, and the fact that whenever they
are forced to confront the will of the peoples of Europe in referenda, and the
people disagree with them, they just re-run the referendum with ever greater
levels of pressure and propaganda until the people give them the answer they
want.
However, I say that there is nothing wrong with
national self-determination. It is foolish and contrary to obvious empirical
fact to deny that differences of national outlook exist and that people with an
independent and distinctive identity wish to run their own affairs. We cannot
have it both ways and impugn imperialism because it denies self-determination
to nations who wish to be independent, and then endorse European federalism
despite the fact that it does much the same thing. Some might give us
idealistic talk about how national differences are the source of the world’s
tensions. They might argue that the world would be much better and more
peaceable if we could eliminate nations and live together free of such
artificial divisions.
There are a couple of responses to be made here.
Firstly, by this perspective having a common European identity is hopelessly chauvinistic,
since it excludes the rest of the human race. Europe is itself a human created
cultural and political entity, so if your problem is excessively narrow identification
with artificial political units then the answer is to advocate world government
rather than a European Federation. Secondly, whatever the rights and wrongs of
it, it is hugely unrealistic to expect national identification, which has historically
proven the most powerful and enduring of all loyalties, trumping class,
ideology, religion and gender, to suddenly melt away. From a pragmatic point of
view, it simply is not going to happen. Thirdly, and most controversially, I
would argue that, so long as it does not become aggressive or based upon a view
of inherent cultural or racial superiority, there is nothing wrong with
identifying oneself politically primarily at the national level. It accords
with the feelings that most people have anyway, and provides a unit of a manageable
size for democratic governance.
Furthermore, those feelings are not invalid. If we
live in a nation, as we all do, we are conscious of certain things, such as a
shared culture, language and history that give our common existence greater
value in our eyes because they are unique and exclusive to us. That does not
mean that we must trumpet these things as inherently superior to the national
identity of other nations or attempt to subjugate other nations, but merely as
preferable to us by virtue of sentiment, familiarity and natural attachment, in
much the same way as we prefer our own family, despite the fact that we would
not necessarily argue that our family is objectively superior, nor would we try
to subjugate other families. The particularity of national attachment is what
gives it its value. Love, in life, comes from loving something exclusively. If
we profess to love everyone or everything, in practice we love nothing. So it
is with nations. So it is also with nations that their interests are
susceptible to differing interpretations. National loyalty and identification
does not necessitate supporting the status quo. It implies supporting what you
think is truly in the interests of the nation, which is, of course,
contestable, but nonetheless always contested within a distinct national
context.
For these reasons, I see no contradiction between my
being proud of my national identity and my being a radical. Our common
language, our system of parliamentary democracy, our landscape, our common
literature and history, among many other things, in my view, bind us together
in such a way as to make it only possible to govern us justly and democratically
on a national basis. Of course, there are elements of these things which I
prefer to emphasise. There is a vision for our destiny as a nation that I
prefer; Britain as a democratic Socialist commonwealth. The point is that only
if we maintain our national sovereignty can this vision be meaningful, just as
a Conservative or Liberal vision for this country can only be meaningful on
that basis. That is the whole point. If we were to subsume our nation within a
Federal Europe, our national destiny would not be within our control, and that
would be intolerable. Exactly the same principle applies to every other
nation-state in Europe, all of which deserve government on the basis of their
national status as much as we do.
As it stands, we find ourselves in an odd half-way
house, half self-determining nation-state, half part of a European Union that
frustrates democratic self-determination by its very nature. As such, the whole
EU project is flawed fundamentally and on a matter of national and democratic
principle, regardless of whether the general drift of its policy at any one
time happens to be conducive to my political perspective or not. This is why I
hope that the reports that the Labour leadership are considering offering a
referendum on our membership of the EU are true and that we are bold enough to
give the people of Britain a genuine say for the first time in nearly 40 years.
It is why I would support leaving the EU if such a referendum were called. None
of this implies that I am blind to the need for co-operation with other nations
on a whole range of matters. I am aware that in light of the pressures put upon
nation-states by such phenomena as globalisation, and indeed the current
financial crisis, such co-operation is more pressing than ever. However, it
should be done on the basis of the genuine democratic will of fully
self-governing nation states, not via the process of relinquishing national
sovereignty to supranational institutions that end up by their nature lacking democratic
legitimacy, such as the EU.
These basic principles trump the supposed arguments
in favour of the supposed benefits that we get from the EU, either in
ideological terms or straight economic terms. Given the austerity being
inflicted on its member states by the EU, the economic argument is looking
flaky at the moment anyway, but no number of pieces of silver could justify us
giving up our right to genuine national democratic self-determination. As such,
I call on my Labour colleagues to at least be honest enough to have the debate.
I call on them to remember the words of Michael Foot when talking on the
subject nearly 40 years ago (albeit in slightly different circumstances):
‘Now people say, “All these burdens, all these
political disabilities, all these derogations from our sovereignty, all this
dismemberment of our parliamentary institutions” - because that is what it
involves – “all that, must be done because of the economic circumstances that
face us. We have no other choice”. I don't believe it, and so I say to this
great conference, at the end, I hope the main message that will go out from
this conference to our movement up and down the country is: Don't be afraid! Don't
let this great Labour movement of ours be afraid. We've lived through this
argument and we still survive, and we will come out a stronger Labour
government I believe at the end. Don't be afraid! And I say to our country, our
great country, don't be afraid! Don't be afraid of those who tell us that we
cannot run our affairs, that we have not the ingenuity to mobilise our
resources and overcome our economic problems. Of course we have, we can do that
and save the freedom of our country at the same time.’