Don’t be Afraid! Democracy, the Labour Movement and the European Union

Note: This piece is largely written without reference to the current financial problems of the EU. Its aim is to address the underlying principle of the EU rather than its current problems.

In 1962, a senior British politician made the following statement about the idea of a federal Europe:

“We must be clear about this; it does mean, if this is the idea, the end of Britain as an independent European state. I make no apology for repeating it. It means the end of a thousand years of history.”

That politician was Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labour Party, and it was quite typical of early Labour attitudes towards the various incarnations of what became the EU. The Attlee government had been hostile towards the first stirrings of the European project, the Coal and Steel Community, on the basis that it was an intolerable intrusion on British political sovereignty and the distinctive British parliamentary path towards socialism. However, the issue of Labour’s attitude towards European economic and political integration only really became prominent with Gaitskell’s impassioned arguments in the context of MacMillan’s failed application for Britain to join the Common Market in the early sixties.

Gaitskell’s visceral hostility to the Common Market was the first prominent salvo in a battle for the soul of Labour over Europe that lasted a quarter of a century. That battle had its quiet periods, and it was characterised by many alterations in fortune for both sides. 

The pro-Europeans, led by the treacherous Roy Jenkins, had their victories. For a while in the sixties Wilson committed the Labour government to entry, until that application failed in 1967. Most notably, Jenkins and other assorted Labour backsliders voted against the Labour whip to provide Ted Heath with the greatest victory of his career; that is, entry to the EC. By the time of the referendum on Britain’s membership in 1975, most prominent Labour politicians, notably Wilson and Callaghan, had, more out of inertia and convenience than any great conviction, backed staying in, and their side duly won that referendum.

However, the enduring fact was that between 1962 and the late 1980s, the underlying position of the majority of the Labour movement was one of hostility to the European Community. Most major trade unions were opposed, much of the grassroots membership and  many Labour supporters in the country were, to varying degrees, sceptical, and a number of prominent MPs, from Tony Benn and Barbara Castle to Peter Shore and Michael Foot, fought against Britain entering or staying in the EC. Labour voted against the European Communities Act which facilitated British entry to the EC (with the exception of those Europhiles like Jenkins, Rodgers and Williams, most of whom ended up betraying the Labour movement by their formation of the SDP), and in several manifestos pledged explicitly to leave the EC.

I recount these historical facts to provide context to those who have grown up in the modern Labour Party. Such people may not be aware that Labour has ever had a position different from its view over the past fifteen years: that is to say, largely unconsidered and occasionally ambivalent support. Divisions clearly did not disappear entirely. Brown and his followers in government were marginally more Eurosceptic than the Blairites, and an honourable tradition of backbench hostility, in the form of old hands like Austin Mitchell, endured. However, if anything summed up Labour’s attitude toward the EU in the New Labour years, it was a lack of interest. We never made much of it, in contrast to the Tories, because, in general, it was not an issue that the majority of the electorate expressed much concern about. We fell into quiet pro-EU orthodoxy more out of inertia and indifference than anything else. I largely followed this line as a young activist, without giving it much thought.

However, recently I have seriously began to re-think this position and have changed my view significantly.

In order to illustrate this, we need to go back to the moment when Labour’s position on the EU is usually considered to have fundamentally changed. This was Jacque Delors’s famous speech to the 1988 TUC conference when he presented the EC as a refuge from the ravages of Thatcherism, the only means of defending workers’ rights. He sold the EU to the Labour Party and the unions on the basis of the supposed merits of its ‘social dimension’. This consolidated the pre-existing shift in direction from Kinnock on the issue, and prepared the ground for Kinnock’s openly pro-EU conference speech in 1988.

From then on, the debate over the EU has been largely presented within the Labour Party and wider mainstream left as being essentially a question of defining the socio-economic consequences of our membership of the EU. If it can be shown that the neoliberal side of EU policy is most prominent, in the form of, for example, its emphasis on free markets in goods, services, labour, and capital, and the deregulation and liberalisation of those markets, the argument goes, then we should be anti-EU, or at least in favour of radical reform of the policies of the EU from the inside. If the social aspects of the EU are perceived to be predominant, in the form of the Social Chapter and the protection of workers’ rights, then we should be pro-EU. So, for example, the short-lived NO2EU party, which stood in the 2009 European Elections and was the brainchild of Bob Crow, took the former position. Labour MEPs are keen on making the latter argument, which has become the orthodox position of the Labour Party.

It is not surprising that in 1988, after 9 years of punishing Thatcherite government, the Labour movement was, like a thirsty man staggering about in the desert, desperate for any sustenance that it could perceive, or at least thought it could perceive. Trades unionists and beleaguered Labour MPs did not see anything much to lose in such a context by throwing their lot in with the EU. Surely, they thought, it has to be improvement on preserving national sovereignty when that sovereignty was in the possession of a right-wing Tory coterie.

However, my contention is that the entire framework within which this argument takes place is misconceived.

There are clearly arguments on both sides in terms of the consequences of EU membership on the nature of British socio-economic policy. The Left is divided, as we have seen. The Right is also divided, between those who think that regulations emanating from the EU have produced an unduly inflexible labour market and excessive red-tape which has stunted growth, and those who praise the advantages provided by the EU to the functioning of a capitalist market economy.

The complexion of the EU is, as such, truly in the eye of the beholder. It is like a brilliant piece of quartz that looks mesmerisingly different depending on which angle you hold it at. Given the ambiguous, slow-sand-shifting nature of the EU, this is inevitable. The policies of the EU have been decided by a massive, ever-changing constellation of political forces over a long period. They are the result of a massive bureaucratic decision making process that encompasses the representatives of 27 nation states within numerous different institutions, most notably the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the  European Parliament. We must also factor in the sprawling negotiations between countless heads of state and bureaucrats that resulted in the numerous treaties that shaped the underlying structure of the EU, from Paris to Lisbon. The EU’s policies have been the result of a painstaking, inordinately complicated political sausage factory over 60 years. The ultimate character of the EU’s economic and social policies is determined by the overall political balance of forces within Europe, which inevitably tos-and-fros. Often this balance of forces is more a deadlock of forces, which necessitates compromises to satisfy the vanities of multifarious different governments, statesmen and political parties, not to mention unelected elites. This makes the EU fundamentally ambiguous in character. It is scarcely any wonder that a bewildering variety of politicians manage to hold identical positions on the EU despite having almost nothing else in common; everyone can find something within this colossal Euro mish-mash to suit their prejudices if they wish, and with such eclectic material ideologues of both sides can patch together a case for or against according to which elements they choose to emphasise, and it is to some extent a matter of circumstance, convenience and temperament which side they choose to fall on.

With this in mind, I would nonetheless at this stage register my (no doubt partial) view that the EU in the past decade or so has gone substantially down the path of imposing neoliberal orthodoxy and austerity, both in its recent handling of the Eurozone crisis, the growth and stability pact (and other similar attempts at a common economic policy), and in terms of the impact of many of its directives on competition policy and state aid, which have undermined collective bargaining, sane, interventionist industrial policy, national employment standards and wage rates. 

However, this is in many ways beside the point. The very ambiguous nature of the EU shows the fundamental problem with it. If we, as British Leftists, are lucky enough to live in an era of social-democratic dominance within Europe, with most major European countries enjoying left-leaning governments, then eventually the EU sausage machine might crank out some bangers of consolation, as the drift of policy within the EU goes our way. If we are unlucky, as we have been recently, the opposite might occur, which might mean, for example, a drift towards an emphasis on market liberalisation and an erosion of workers’ rights that we might not like. The point is, however, is that British national policy on many issues becomes largely at the mercy of forces over which we as a nation have little control, and which, for that very reason, are not very susceptible to proper democratic control.

This links in to the fundamental and profound point. Democracy, that is to say, representative democracy in the way we understand it, as embodied in our system of parliamentary democracy, has its natural geographical and national limits. The EU, while it is still made up of nation states who see themselves as meaningful and distinct cultural and political units, can never be properly or meaningfully democratic. A democracy can only function in a political unit in which all its individual members see themselves having enough of a common existence for the will of its majority to represent something meaningful. The nation state and representative democracy appeared at much the same time in history, which was no coincidence. Only the large degree of commonality of identity provided by being members of the same nation state (or similar unit) has ever provided the conditions for a legitimate representative democracy. The EU is made up of 500 million people, and the vast, vast majority of those people do not recognise the kind of common European citizenship that would be required to make EU-wide democracy meaningful. They see themselves as being citizens of nation states, and will accept as binding and legitimate decisions taken in a democratic way only at a national level. For example, if we had a European-wide referendum on an issue, and Britain vote 95% to support one side, but every other EU country voted 95% the other way, then the overall result would be for the side Britain did not support, and we as a nation would have to put up with it. That would not make it any easier for Britain to swallow, and, I daresay the same would be the case if you replaced the word ‘Britain’ with practically any other country in Europe. This is because it would feel like a decision being imposed by alien forces upon us as a nation.

There are several reasons for this. One is the issue of size. In a democracy, each individual by definition has his or her say on the overall policy diluted in proportion to the size of the population of the state in question. The very nature of representative democracy makes this dilution considerable. However, it seems to me that there must be a point at which it becomes so diluted as to be akin to a homeopathic treatment. It seems to me that such a point of dilution would be reached in a polity as large as a hypothetical United States of Europe. There are clearly variations in size between nations, but there seems an upper-limit to the level of dilution that will be widely accepted which is rarely contravened by the population of an average or even large nation state. This seems to me to be a matter of intuitive common sense. 

The other, and more profound, reason is that the EU is not and will never be constituted as a polity in such a way as to mean that it could attempt to have democratic institutions in a way analogous to a nation state. The only way that it could possibly work would be to have a federal system, which is the practical solution adopted by the two largest democracies in the world, and the only two real cases that would be analogous to a United States of Europe; that is, India and the USA. However, these countries have a sufficient consciousness of a national identity to make some degree of unity at the federal level, in terms of, for example, foreign and defence policy, possible (though this is sometimes debatable in the case of the USA).  This consciousness of a common national identity does not exist to sustain any level of democratic federal government in the EU at large. Some idealists who find within their own bosom a zealous consciousness of a common Europeanism may wish this were not the case, but they are deluding themselves.
 

So the EU ends up in the worst of all worlds due to the natural consequences of political, cultural and national realities. Its member states are too jealous of their national identities, of being German or British or French rather than European, for a federal system, with a properly democratic structure at the federal level, to exist. However, they are not prepared to dissolve the EU and revert to being nation states with the democratic apparatus of a unitary state as the only means of mediating the operation of their sovereignty. So, the decisions taken in common have largely fallen outside the control of proper democratic accountability. Many decisions are taken by elected heads of state in the Council of Ministers, which is typically unsatisfactory for two reasons. Either it leads to some nations imposing their views on other nations, which, since most people perceive themselves to exist politically primarily as voting citizens of their nation state, is not perceived as being democratic. On the other hand, if there is deadlock in the Council of Ministers due to the need for unanimity on some topics, then nothing happens. For this reason qualified majority voting has increasingly replaced unanimous decision making and has been diluted to make it easier for things to pass. Even more worryingly, the Commission has become more and more powerful. Let us not forget that the Commission is utterly lacking in democratic accountability. The people of Europe have no way of removing the commissioners, who have such a colossal influence over the lives of millions of people, by the ballot box or any other peaceful means. In other words, the rules have been changed to make it easier for large nations to push through the policies they prefer, or responsibility has been given to a non-democratic body to get around this problem. 

Of course, the European Parliament does have some role, and it has enjoyed a moderate increase in power since its inception. However, it suffers from the same problems as every other EU institution. Since hardly anyone in Europe sees themselves as primarily or even significantly a democratic citizen of the EU due to the lack of a meaningful unifying European identity, but instead see themselves as essentially citizens of their nation state, they would not be prepared to see the European parliament as the authentic legislative body expressing their will even if it had the power of a national parliament, which, of course, it does not.

In short, only a people who perceive themselves as a unified political unit can be represented satisfactorily in a democratic institution. Since the former condition does not exist, and is not likely to ever exist, among the people of the EU, the EU cannot and will not ever have political institutions that are properly democratic.

This raises further questions. At least, it does if you are an ideologically convinced Euro-federalist. Is it the fault of the people of Europe that they do not see themselves as, first and foremost, citizens of Europe, prepared to embrace an out and out federal system? Is the inability to eliminate the mindset of identification at the political level of the nation a symptom of an immaturity that will eventually render the EU and its member states a geopolitical irrelevance?

These questions give a flavour of the tone of elitist arrogance that characterises those within the EU who favour a federal solution. It is, as usual, the fault of the stupidity and parochial character of the people of Europe, who do not understand the infinitely subtle mechanism being constructed by their superiors. This arrogance has been shown in the constant attempts of Euro-federalist elites to force us into ‘ever closer union’ with little consultation of the people of Europe, and the fact that whenever they are forced to confront the will of the peoples of Europe in referenda, and the people disagree with them, they just re-run the referendum with ever greater levels of pressure and propaganda until the people give them the answer they want.

However, I say that there is nothing wrong with national self-determination. It is foolish and contrary to obvious empirical fact to deny that differences of national outlook exist and that people with an independent and distinctive identity wish to run their own affairs. We cannot have it both ways and impugn imperialism because it denies self-determination to nations who wish to be independent, and then endorse European federalism despite the fact that it does much the same thing. Some might give us idealistic talk about how national differences are the source of the world’s tensions. They might argue that the world would be much better and more peaceable if we could eliminate nations and live together free of such artificial divisions.

There are a couple of responses to be made here. Firstly, by this perspective having a common European identity is hopelessly chauvinistic, since it excludes the rest of the human race. Europe is itself a human created cultural and political entity, so if your problem is excessively narrow identification with artificial political units then the answer is to advocate world government rather than a European Federation. Secondly, whatever the rights and wrongs of it, it is hugely unrealistic to expect national identification, which has historically proven the most powerful and enduring of all loyalties, trumping class, ideology, religion and gender, to suddenly melt away. From a pragmatic point of view, it simply is not going to happen. Thirdly, and most controversially, I would argue that, so long as it does not become aggressive or based upon a view of inherent cultural or racial superiority, there is nothing wrong with identifying oneself politically primarily at the national level. It accords with the feelings that most people have anyway, and provides a unit of a manageable size for democratic governance.

Furthermore, those feelings are not invalid. If we live in a nation, as we all do, we are conscious of certain things, such as a shared culture, language and history that give our common existence greater value in our eyes because they are unique and exclusive to us. That does not mean that we must trumpet these things as inherently superior to the national identity of other nations or attempt to subjugate other nations, but merely as preferable to us by virtue of sentiment, familiarity and natural attachment, in much the same way as we prefer our own family, despite the fact that we would not necessarily argue that our family is objectively superior, nor would we try to subjugate other families. The particularity of national attachment is what gives it its value. Love, in life, comes from loving something exclusively. If we profess to love everyone or everything, in practice we love nothing. So it is with nations. So it is also with nations that their interests are susceptible to differing interpretations. National loyalty and identification does not necessitate supporting the status quo. It implies supporting what you think is truly in the interests of the nation, which is, of course, contestable, but nonetheless always contested within a distinct national context.

For these reasons, I see no contradiction between my being proud of my national identity and my being a radical. Our common language, our system of parliamentary democracy, our landscape, our common literature and history, among many other things, in my view, bind us together in such a way as to make it only possible to govern us justly and democratically on a national basis. Of course, there are elements of these things which I prefer to emphasise. There is a vision for our destiny as a nation that I prefer; Britain as a democratic Socialist commonwealth. The point is that only if we maintain our national sovereignty can this vision be meaningful, just as a Conservative or Liberal vision for this country can only be meaningful on that basis. That is the whole point. If we were to subsume our nation within a Federal Europe, our national destiny would not be within our control, and that would be intolerable. Exactly the same principle applies to every other nation-state in Europe, all of which deserve government on the basis of their national status as much as we do.

As it stands, we find ourselves in an odd half-way house, half self-determining nation-state, half part of a European Union that frustrates democratic self-determination by its very nature. As such, the whole EU project is flawed fundamentally and on a matter of national and democratic principle, regardless of whether the general drift of its policy at any one time happens to be conducive to my political perspective or not. This is why I hope that the reports that the Labour leadership are considering offering a referendum on our membership of the EU are true and that we are bold enough to give the people of Britain a genuine say for the first time in nearly 40 years. It is why I would support leaving the EU if such a referendum were called. None of this implies that I am blind to the need for co-operation with other nations on a whole range of matters. I am aware that in light of the pressures put upon nation-states by such phenomena as globalisation, and indeed the current financial crisis, such co-operation is more pressing than ever. However, it should be done on the basis of the genuine democratic will of fully self-governing nation states, not via the process of relinquishing national sovereignty to supranational institutions that end up by their nature lacking democratic legitimacy, such as the EU.

These basic principles trump the supposed arguments in favour of the supposed benefits that we get from the EU, either in ideological terms or straight economic terms. Given the austerity being inflicted on its member states by the EU, the economic argument is looking flaky at the moment anyway, but no number of pieces of silver could justify us giving up our right to genuine national democratic self-determination. As such, I call on my Labour colleagues to at least be honest enough to have the debate. I call on them to remember the words of Michael Foot when talking on the subject nearly 40 years ago (albeit in slightly different circumstances): 

‘Now people say, “All these burdens, all these political disabilities, all these derogations from our sovereignty, all this dismemberment of our parliamentary institutions” - because that is what it involves – “all that, must be done because of the economic circumstances that face us. We have no other choice”. I don't believe it, and so I say to this great conference, at the end, I hope the main message that will go out from this conference to our movement up and down the country is: Don't be afraid! Don't let this great Labour movement of ours be afraid. We've lived through this argument and we still survive, and we will come out a stronger Labour government I believe at the end. Don't be afraid! And I say to our country, our great country, don't be afraid! Don't be afraid of those who tell us that we cannot run our affairs, that we have not the ingenuity to mobilise our resources and overcome our economic problems. Of course we have, we can do that and save the freedom of our country at the same time.’